Professor Alex Tabarrok reviews a fascinating and disturbing book about occupational licensing, The Licensing Racket by Rebecca Haw Allensworth, in the Wall Street Journal.
Most people will concede that licensing for hair braiders and interior decorators is excessive while licensing for doctors, nurses and lawyers is essential. Hair braiders pose little to no threat to public safety, but subpar doctors, nurses and lawyers can ruin lives. To Ms. Allensworth’s credit, she asks for evidence. Does occupational licensing protect consumers? The author focuses on the professional board, the forgotten institution of occupational licensing.
Governments enact occupational-licensing laws but rarely handle regulation directly—there’s no Bureau of Hair Braiding. Instead, interpretation and enforcement are delegated to licensing boards, typically dominated by members of the profession. Occupational licensing is self-regulation. The outcome is predictable: Driven by self-interest, professional identity and culture, these boards consistently favor their own members over consumers.
Ms. Allensworth conducted exhaustive research for “The Licensing Racket,” spending hundreds of hours attending board meetings—often as the only nonboard member present. At the Tennessee board of alarm-system contractors, most of the complaints come from consumers who report the sort of issues that licensing is meant to prevent: poor installation, code violations, high-pressure sales tactics and exploitation of the elderly. But the board dismisses most of these complaints against its own members, and is far more aggressive in disciplining unlicensed handymen who occasionally install alarm systems. As Ms. Allensworth notes, “the board was ten times more likely to take action in a case alleging unlicensed practice than one complaining about service quality or safety.”
She finds similar patterns among boards that regulate auctioneers, cosmetologists and barbers. Enforcement efforts tend to protect turf more than consumers. Consumers care about bad service, not about who is licensed, so take a guess who complains about unlicensed practitioners? Licensed practitioners. According to Ms. Allensworth, it was these competitor-initiated cases, “not consumer complaints alleging fraud, predatory sales tactics, and graft,” where boards gave the stiffest penalties.
You might hope that boards that oversee nurses and doctors would prioritize patient safety, but Ms. Allensworth’s findings show otherwise. She documents a disturbing pattern of boards that have ignored or forgiven egregious misconduct, including nurses and physicians extorting sex for prescriptions, running pill mills, assaulting patients under anesthesia and operating while intoxicated.
You can read the whole article at this link. Studess tend to find that licensing requirements increase costs to consumers while not improving the quality of services.
Three states mandate useless “inclusivity” training for cosmetologists, making it more costly to be a cosmetologist while teaching them useless DEI buzzwords.
It is dumb for states to require hairstylists to attend beauty school, rather than just getting on-the-job training. Hairstylists don’t need hundreds of hours of training at a beauty school to do their jobs properly. But states require that anyway, as a condition for hairstylists being allowed to work.
Back in the 1950s, most states didn’t require hairstylists to get a license before they could cut people’s hair. Just 4 percent of Americans needed a license to work in 1950. Now, 30 percent of Americans need a occupational license to work.
The harm from excessive occupational licensing regulations is so obvious that it has been noted by the administrations of Donald Trump, Kamala Harris, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden, all of which recognized the need to cut back on occupational-licensing restrictions. “During the Obama administration, the Department of Labor and the White House Council of Economic Advisers published a lengthy report on licensing laws, and called for states to take action to remove unnecessary barriers to work. ‘Licensing restrictions cost millions of jobs nationwide and raise consumer expenses by over one hundred billion dollars,’ it concluded.”
The Trump administration also recognized the harm of occupational licensing, saying that “the cost and complexity of licensing creates an economic barrier for Americans seeking a job” and “a barrier for Americans that move from state to state.” Excessive occupational licensing also drives up the rate of theft and property crimes by increasing joblessness.
Kamala Harris also called for cutting back on occupational-licensing regulations in her 2024 presidential campaign.
Matt Yglesias describes how “beauty schools are ripping off their students. Terrible licensing rules deserve some of the blame.” He cites a New York Times article “about beauty schools that leave their students drowning in debt rather than opening up” job opportunities, thanks to “occupational licensing” rules.
To cut hair in New York state, you need to graduate from barber school. The number of hours of barber schooling you need is “determined by the approved NYS barber schools.” . . if you’ve been cutting hair in New Jersey and want to move your practice to the other side of the Hudson, that license is no good. Do New Yorkers whose kids go off to college in other states warn them about the dangers of Connecticut or California or Massachusetts barbers? Not in my experience, but the state of the New York takes the official view that the regulatory requirements in 46 states (and the District of Columbia) are not up to snuff.
As Yglesias points out, mandatory-school-attendance requirements for barbers and hair-stylists make no sense. Indeed, such attendance requirements make no sense even for occupations where public safety is at issue and some form of licensing may thus be justified (comically, defenders of beauty-school attendance mandates depict hair-styling as being a dangerous occupation where licensing is needed due to the presence of chemicals in hair treatments). As he notes, it makes more sense to require competency to be shown
purely through certification. In other words: You need to be able to pass the test. In that world, a beauty school can stay in business if and only if it offers a cost-effective training regime. Beauty schools would need to compete with efforts at self-instruction or with apprenticeship arrangements of various kinds. Instead, by requiring the 1,000 hours of training, the state licensing board creates a cozy business for the beauty schools. They become for-profit gatekeepers to economic opportunity. And their incentive structure isn’t to focus on effective education—the quality of the teaching is irrelevant to the business model. It’s to focus on maximizing the amount of money extracted from the students.
Many occupations that are now licensed do not need to be licensed to protect anyone. And the few that do, tend to have excessive requirements for getting a license:
“Licensing is a barrier to entry for all Americans looking for work in certain professions, but it’s particularly pernicious for those on the lower end of the economic ladder. For example, getting a license to cut hair can require more than a year of expensive schooling in some states, while becoming an interior designer in places like Florida requires more than 2,000 days (yes, days!) of training. There’s little evidence that licensing those professions does much of anything to protect public health and safety.
“Once you have a license, you might be stuck in the state where you earned it. A 2015 study by the Brookings Institution found that licensed workers were less likely to migrate between states, but not necessarily because people are happy in those places. Instead, researchers say workers feel locked in place because most state-issued professional licenses are not transferable, so moving out-of-state means you’d be out of business unless you can obtain a new license in your new home.”
