“Good headlights can reduce your likelihood of having a crash at night by up to 20%,” notes Will Rinehart. “Why aren’t they available here in the US? Because adaptive beams don’t have dedicated, separate high and low beams, they violate” a federal transportation regulation, FMVSS 108.
As a web site explains,
if these ADB beams can make nighttime driving safer, why aren’t they available here in the U.S.? The reason is basic bureaucracy. In 1967, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety developed a regulation (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108), which specified that road-legal vehicles must have a dedicated high beam and a dedicated low beam. Because adaptive beams don’t have dedicated, separate high and low beams, they violate this regulation. Adaptive beams can adjust brightness and illumination area, but they do all of it using the same LED lights….Clearly, the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 was written before anyone at National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA) conceived of headlights that could respond to external stimuli and selectively alter luminescence based on environment. But it’s still a regulatory blind spot, if you will, that has prevented safer technology from being fully utilized in the U.S.
An automaker petitioned NHTSA to permit ADB technology in U.S. vehicles in 2018. But the technology still isn’t available in the U.S.
This is actually a common problem for auto safety regulations, and federal regulations in general. Many federal regulations make people less safe.
Auto safety improved more rapidly before activist Ralph Nader got the federal government to ramp up regulation of automakers. The auto industry became much less competitive, and less able to improve safety, as a result of Nader’s actions, notes Kenneth Whyte in Quillette. He calls it the “Sack of Detroit.” Prior to extensive federal regulation, he notes, American automakers had been able to “to reduce annual American road fatalities per miles driven by 80 percent.” Moreover, “there was more safety progress in the half-century before the 1966 legislation than in the half-century that followed.” Consumers, after all, valued safety improvements, and were willing to pay somewhat more for safer automobiles.
Aggressive federal regulation often costs thousands of lives. The Obama administration stretched federal law to make it harder for Americans to obtain life-saving bone-marrow transplants. It did so even though around 3,000 Americans die every year waiting for a marrow transplant because an appropriate match cannot be found.
The federal ban on kidney sales costs 30,000 lives annually. Kidney failure shouldn’t be a death sentence. But for thousands of people, it is, thanks to federal laws banning organ sales. Those laws radically shrink the supply of kidneys and other organs that people desperately need to stay alive. As law professor Ilya Somin notes,
Many Americans die every year because they need kidney transplants, in large part due to federal laws banning organ sales. … [A]n average of over 30,000 Americans have died each year, because the ban prevented them from getting transplants in time.
This seems like a very conservative estimate of the death toll. Somin cites a recent study in the Journal of the American Society of Nephrology, titled “The Terrible Toll of the Kidney Shortage.” It notes that the “106,000” people “who do not receive a transplant” due to the current kidney shortage “are fated to live an average of 5 years on dialysis therapy before dying prematurely.”
Right now, people have to be unusually altruistic to donate a kidney, spending several days in the hospital, taking time off, and running a tiny risk of death.
Somin and others say the ban on organ sales should be repealed to save lives. Back in 2011, kidney donor Alexander Berger explained why kidney sales should be legal in The New York Times. Berger was a researcher for GiveWell, a nonprofit that helps charitable donors decide where to give. Berger predicted that allowing kidney donors to be compensated would save countless lives by giving people an incentive to donate their kidneys, resulting in a vast increase in kidney donations.
Right now, people have to be unusually altruistic to donate a kidney, since you have to spend several days in the hospital to donate one, take off a lot of time from work, and run a tiny risk of death. Few people are that selfless. Allowing kidney sales would also help the poor, who currently often are unable to obtain kidneys: as Berger notes, people unable to get kidney transplants now are “disproportionately African-American and poor.”
If kidney sales were legal, the taxpayers would save money, too. The government would be able to simply pay for kidney transplants for poor and elderly people who need them (including the cost of buying the kidney needed for the transplant), rather than paying for years and years of costly dialysis treatment through Medicare and Medicaid. The purchase price of a kidney would be much less than the ongoing cost of dialysis.
As Berger noted, if the government paid for kidneys, that would actually “save the government money; taxpayers already foot the bill for dialysis for many patients through Medicare, and research has shown that transplants save more than $100,000 per patient, relative to dialysis.” (By legalizing organ sales, one nation, Iran, was able to eliminate waiting lists for transplants, and avoid the staggering costs of widespread dialysis.)
The case for organ sales is even stronger than for allowing professional football, which has greater risks associated with it.
As Berger observed, people who receive compensation for their kidneys will not be “exploited.” While there is some risk associated with donating a kidney—the whole reason compensation is needed—“the risk of death during surgery is about 1 in 3,000,” smaller than many risks that everyone is already allowed to take in exchange for money or just for the heck of it. Moreover, a kidney donor’s “remaining kidney will grow to take up the slack of the one that has been removed.” So donating a kidney does not interfere with leading a normal life.
Professor Somin says the exploitation argument against organ sales is logically inconsistent. Most of the people who “oppose legalizing organ markets because they believe it would lead to exploitation” have “no objection to letting poor people perform much more dangerous work, such as becoming lumberjacks or NFL players.”
This makes no sense, because, unlike the ban on organ sales, which kills thousands of people, a ban on professional football would not kill anyone. So, the case for organ sales is even stronger than for allowing professional football, which has greater risks associated with it, such as widespread traumatic brain injury and degenerative brain disease.
As one commenter notes, “The risk of dying during kidney donation (0.03 percent) is equivalent to going sky diving twice or driving 20,000 miles. Donating a kidney has the same risk as commuting 40 miles to work for one year,” a risk people commonly assume just to get to work.
Moreover, as Somin notes,
In addition to offering payment to living donors, we can pay potential donors in advance for the ‘option’ of harvesting organs after they pass away, a strategy that eliminates any negative health effects on donors, since, by definition, the option can only be exercised after they have died, and have no further use for the organ themselves.
Such an option eliminates any risk of “exploitation.”
As Berger notes, the ban on kidney sales is most harmful to minorities and low-income people:
The victims of the current ban are disproportionately African-American and poor. When wealthy white people find their way onto the kidney waiting list, they are much more likely to get off it early by finding a donor among their friends and family (or, as Steve Jobs did for a liver transplant in 2009, by traveling to a region with a shorter list). Worst of all, the ban encourages an international black market, where desperate people do end up selling their organs, without protection, fair compensation or proper medical care.
Many kinds of body tissue can be purchased, so why not organs like kidneys, livers, and hearts? In 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it is legal to compensate bone marrow donors. Similarly, as Berger points out:
[W]e already allow paid plasma, sperm and egg donation, as well as payment for surrogate mothers. Contrary to early fears that paid surrogacy would exploit young, poor minority women, most surrogate mothers are married, middle class and white; the evidence suggests that, far from trying to ‘cash in,’ they take pride in performing a service that brings others great happiness.
And we regularly pay people to take socially beneficial but physically dangerous jobs — soldiers, police officers and firefighters all earn a living serving society while risking their lives — without worrying that they are taken advantage of. Compensated kidney donors should be no different.
People in need of other organs, like hearts, would also benefit from legalizing organ sales. As Emily Largent observes at the Harvard Law School website, there is also a large “unmet need for hearts, lungs, livers, and other vital organs” that might be filled, if organ donations were compensated.
In the past, critics argued that organ markets should be banned because it is inherently wrong to profit from or “commodify” the human body. Yet, as Professor Somin observes, most of them don’t object to letting a wide range of people profit from organ transplants, including doctors, insurance companies, hospital administrators, and medical equipment suppliers. All of these people get paid (often quite well) for doing so.
Strangely, the only participant in the transplant process who is forbidden to profit from the organ is the one who provided it in the first place. As Professor Somin notes,
If you believe that people should be forbidden to sell kidneys because earning a profit from organs is immoral ‘commodification’ of the body, you must either oppose paying all the other people who currently earn money from organ transplants, or explain why they, unlike the original owner of the kidney, are not also engaged in commodification.
As Somin observes,
The same goes for people who argue that kidney markets should be banned because earning money from transactions involving body parts will somehow corrupt our morals. If the morals of doctors, nurses, and others are not corrupted as a result of repeatedly earning a large part of their livelihood from organ transplants, it is not clear why the morality of donors will be corrupted by earning money from selling a body part on just one or a few occasions.
