Nevertheless, calling someone a whore can be legally risky, even when it contains an element of truth. In Johnson v. Johnson (1995), the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld an award of $5,000 in damages against an ex-husband who called his adulterous ex-wife a “whore.” The court recognized that he was not literally saying she was a prostitute, but rather using the word “whore” to accuse her of adultery. And she was in fact guilty of flagrant, unlawful adultery! As the court explained,
The term “whore” has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as:
“A woman who practices illicit sexual intercourse, either for hire or to gratify a depraved passion. A woman given to promiscuous intercourse. A woman who practices unlawful commerce with men, particularly one who does so for hire; a harlot; a concubine; a prostitute.”
But the fact that the ex-husband was truthful in calling his ex-wife a whore was no defense when he was sued for slander, the court ruled. That’s because he said it “maliciously” in anger, and his ex-wife was not a public figure — so his truthfully calling her a whore was not protected by the First Amendment, the court ruled. There are other states where courts say truth is a complete defense in a defamation case, even when the person suing you for defamation is not a public figure. But Rhode Island is not one of those states. So you can’t tell someone your adulterous ex-spouse is a whore if you live in Rhode Island.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court did overturn a $20,000 punitive damages award against Mr. Johnson for calling Ms. Johnson a whore, because the truthfulness of his statement militated against an award of punitive damages. But it upheld a $5,000 compensatory damage award against him, which he had to pay to his ex-wife.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court explained,
The findings of fact made by the trial justice are clear and unequivocal that the plaintiff [ex-wife] fit the definition of the defamatory term applied to her [whore]. Thus the only question to be decided was whether the statement was uttered maliciously. This does not mean First Amendment constitutional “actual malice” but refers to common-law malice “arising from spite or ill will, or culpable recklessness or willful or wanton disregard of the rights and interests of the person defamed.”…The findings of fact of the trial justice would lead us to the inevitable conclusion that this defendant had been sorely provoked and misused by plaintiff in the course of her marital and extramarital relationship with him…When defendant uttered the defamatory statement, he was certainly angry. We cannot say that the trial justice was clearly wrong when he confirmed the probable finding of the jury….that defendant acted out of spite and ill will. In this case some spite and ill will might be understandable….
However, on the issue of punitive damages, we have a somewhat different question to resolve. Punitive damages, though allowed in defamation cases,…are severely restricted under Rhode Island law…the party seeking punitive damages has the burden of producing “`evidence of such willfulness, recklessness or wickedness, on the part of the party at fault, as amount[s] to criminality, which for the good of society and warning to the individual, ought to be punished.'”…An award of punitive damages is considered an extraordinary sanction and is disfavored in the law, but it will be permitted if awarded with great caution and within narrow limits.”…The case at bar is somewhat unique in respect to defamation cases, since there is a finding by the trial justice that the statement is essentially truthful. We are then confronted with the question concerning whether a truthful statement, but one issued with a supportable finding of spite or ill will under enormous provocation may meet the rigorous standard which we set for punitive damages. We believe that it does not….the trial justice was clearly wrong in upholding the award of punitive damages. To a great extent defendant was the victim of a long course of reprehensible behavior committed against him by plaintiff. Unfortunately, his unrestrained vituperation would, under Rhode Island law, support a judgment for compensatory damages. The defamatory statement made under extreme provocation does not meet the rigorous standard…Even a finding of spite and ill will in the circumstances of this case cannot warrant punishment in the form of a $20,000 punitive damage award being imposed upon a defendant who was probably more a victim over a longer period of time than was plaintiff.
