Fails to halt uranium enrichment – Iran will continue uranium enrichment to 5 percent, the level needed to operate light water nuclear reactors to generate electricity. While Tehran is required to eliminate the stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium, its 19,000 centrifuges won’t require much time to enrich a sufficient quantity of uranium to 90 percent, the threshold for weapons-grade fissile material. When U.N. sanctions began in late 2006, Iran possessed just hundreds of centrifuges.
Fails to ensure complete verification measures – Though International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors will be granted daily access to uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Fordow, access to uranium mines and mills, and “more frequent” access to the heavy water reactor at Arak designed to produce plutonium, it doesn’t allow inspections for each and every one of Iran’s dozens of known and suspected nuclear sites. Considering that Iran is 1.6 million square kilometers large and mountainous, Secretary of State John Kerry’s “trust but verify” rings hollow when we can’t possibly know everything Tehran is doing outside our field of vision.
Fails to curb missile technology – Iran has worked behind the scenes with North Korea on its missile program for years, successfully testing delivery vehicles that can strike Israel and Turkey. According to a report by the non-partisan Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, the Shahab 1, 2, and 3 missiles can reach 1,000 kilometers, or roughly 600 miles. The Ghadr-1 and Sejil-2 can reach 1,600 and 2,200 kilometers, respectively. Yet missiles are off the table in this accord.